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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
------------------------------------X 
i DOCL'I\1ENT 
: LlLCTRONICALLY FILED 
CAPITOL RECORDS, INC. et al., 
Plaintiffs, 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP) 
-against- MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
MP3TUNES, LLC et al., 
Defendants. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 
WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge: 
Plaintiffs EMI, Inc. and fourteen record companies and music publishers (collectively, 
"EMI") and Defendant Michael Robertson, the CEO ofMP3tunes, LLC, a defunct locker storage 
service for MP3 music files, seek reconsideration of this Court's Memorandum and Order, dated 
October 25,2011 (the "October 2011 Order"), Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. 
Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). These motions spring from the Second Circuit's decision in 
Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). Robertson also seeks 
reconsideration of that portion of the October 2011 Order holding him directly liable for 
copyright infringement ofcertain songs and this Court's July 20,2012 Order finding personal 
jurisdiction over him. Finally, Robertson moves for summary judgment on the issue of his 
vicarious liability for MP3tunes' copyright infringement. For the following reasons, EMI's 
motion is granted in part and denied in part and Robertson's motions are granted in part and 
denied in part. 
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DISCUSSION 

A motion for reconsideration under Local Rule 6.3 "will generally be denied unless the 
moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked ... that might 
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., 
70 F.3d 255,257 (2d Cir. 1995). It is not an invitation to re-litigate issues this Court has already 
decided. Reconsideration requires "an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of 
new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Virgin Atl. 
Airways Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992). As such, 
reconsideration is an "extraordinary remedy." Hinds Cnty., Miss. v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 700 
F. Supp. 2d 378, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
Where there is an arguable "intervening change of controlling law," the Court 
should consider whether the change justifies a departure from the "law of the case" and revision 
of a previous decision. Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, 97 F.3d 1,6 (2d Cir. 1996). 
"Cogent" or "compelling" reasons must exist to justifY such action. See Doe v. NYC Dep't of 
Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983). "It is not enough ... that [a party] could now 
make a more persuasive argument" under more recent case law. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 
100, 109 (2d Cir. 1981). A court must instead have a "clear conviction of error with respect to a 
point oflaw on which its previous decision was predicated." Fogel, 668 F.2d at 109 (internal 
citations omitted). 
I. Reconsideration in View of Via com International v. YouTube 
The October 2011 Order relied on Judge Stanton's decision in Viacom, 718 F. 
Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Because portions of that decision were later reversed by the 
Second Circuit, the parties urge this Court to reconsider several of its rulings. 
2 

Case 1:07-cv-09931-WHP-FM   Document 368    Filed 05/14/13   Page 2 of 19
A. Willful Blindness 
First, Plaintiffs argue that Viacom directs district courts to engage in explicit fact-
finding on the issue of willful blindness before determining that a party is entitled to the 
protections ofthe Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") safe harbors. In ViacoIl!, the 
Second Circuit considered "the application of the common law willful blindness doctrine in the 
DMCA context" as an issue of first impression and held that "the willful blindness doctrine may 
be applied, in appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific 
instances of infringement under the DMCA." 676 F.3d at 34-35. Thus, where a service provider 
is "aware of a high probability of the fact [of infringement] and consciously avoid[ s] confirming 
that fact," that provider is willfully blind to infringement and may lose the protections of the safe 
harbor. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35. 
Viacom offers little guidance on how to reconcile the tension between the 
doctrine ofwillful blindness and the DMCA's explicit repudiation of any affirmative duty on the 
part of service providers to monitor user content. See 17 U.S.c. § 512(m) (safe harbor protection 
shall not be conditioned on "a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking 
facts indicating infringing activity"). While Viacom hints in a footnote that knowledge of 
general infringing activity would likely not constitute willful blindness, see Tiffany (N]) Inc. v. 
eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010), it eschewed any bright line rules in favor of"explicit 
fact-finding" on the issue. 676 F.3d at 35 n.10. 
Defendants argue that this Court already considered the issue ofwillful blindness 
when it found that MP3tunes "does not purposefully blind itselfto its users' identities and 
activities." MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 638. But the context of that ruling was an evaluation 
ofthe sufficiency ofMP3tunes' repeat infringer policy, which every service provider claiming 
DMCA safe harbor protection must implement. Such a finding does not "explicitly" address the 
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issue ofwhether MP3tunes "engaged in a deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge" regarding 
the sideloaded content itself, as opposed to tracking its users' activities. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35 
(quoting In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)). MP3tunes' ability 
to identify repeat infringers does not mean that it never looked the other way when confronted by 
a high probability that certain conduct was infringing. As Judge Stanton noted on remand, 
"[a]pplying the doctrine [ofwillful blindness] requires attention to its scope," and "[i]n imputing 
knowledge ofthe willfully disregarded fact, one must not impute more knowledge than the fact 
conveyed." Viacom InCI. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., --- F.Supp.2d ----, No. 07 Civ. 2103 (LLS), 
2013 WL 1689071, at * 4 (S.D.N.Y. April 18, 2013). But "[u]nder appropriate circumstances 
the imputed knowledge of the willfully-avoided fact may impose a duty to make further inquiries 
that a reasonable person would make[.]" Viacom, 2013 WL 1689071, at * 4. 
This Court finds that a jury could reasonably interpret several documents in the 
record as imposing a duty to make further inquiries into "specific and identifiable" instances of 
possible infringement. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32. For example, an email received by MP3tunes in 
April 2007 gives a specific blog title and states, "[a]1though I don't like ratting myself out, 
everything I post is in clear violation of the DMCA .... please remove any MP3s that are linked 
to that site." (Declaration ofAndrew Bart ("Bart Decl."), dated Oct. 29, 2010 Ex. 70.) Another 
email from November 2007 states, "if you search for 'the clash I fought the law' ... you will get 
5 results ... 2 ofwhich point to the website www.officerjellynutz.com[.] This website blatantly 
acknowledges that it contains infringing MP3's." (Bart Dec!. Ex. 92.) In a third email, an 
MP3tunes employee acknowledges that while "it's not clear if [content from a user's site] is all 
copyright [sic] material ... it probably is though." (Bart DecL Ex. 65.) Because Viacom 
emphasizes the importance ofexplicit fact-finding in establishing willful blindness, this Court 
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vacates that portion of the October 2011 Order granting summary judgment to Defendants on the 
issue of contributory infringement liability for those songs not subject to DMCA-compliant 
takedown notices and finds that factual issues preclude summary judgment. 
B. "Red Flag" Knowledge of Infringement 
Service providers can lose the protection of the DMCA safe harbors if they have 
actual or apparent (also called "red flag") knowledge of infringing content. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 
512(c)(1)(A) and (d)(1). In the October 2011 Order, this Court found that Plaintiffs failed to 
show either actual or red flag knowledge of infringement for songs that were not the subject of 
DMCA-compliant takedown notices. MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 645. Plaintiffs now argue 
that Viacom establishes that red flag knowledge can be demonstrated by evidence other than 
formal takedown notices, such as internal and third-party communications regarding the content 
at issue. 
In Viacom, the Second Circuit affirmed that DMCA safe harbor protections can 
be lost only where a provider has actual or apparent knowledge of"specific and identifiable 
instances" of infringement. 676 F.3d at 32. In doing so, Judge Cabranes rejected Viacom's 
argument that red flag knowledge could be shown through a "general awareness that 
infringement may be occurring." Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35. Instead, Viacom establishes an 
exquisite "subjective/objective" standard for distinguishing between "actual" and "red flag" 
knowledge: "the actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or 
'subjectively' knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the 
provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement 
'objectively' obvious to a reasonable person." Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31. But both actual and red 
flag knowledge "apply only to specific instances of infringement." Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31. 
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While Viacom found Judge Stanton's decision and others-including this Court's 
October 2011 Order-to be "generally in accord" with its view of the specificity requirement, 
the Second Circuit nevertheless reversed Judge Stanton's grant of summary judgment to the 
defendant service providers as premature. 676 F.3d at 32. Because YouTube executives decided 
not to remove specific content they acknowledged among themselves was almost certainly 
infringing, the Second Circuit was ''persuaded that the plaintiffs may have raised a material issue 
of fact regarding Y ouTube's knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement .... 
especially in the absence of any detailed examination of the extensive record on summary 
judgment[.]" 676 F.3d at 34. EMI contends that it introduced similar evidence sufficient to 
create a material issue of fact regarding Defendants' red flag knowledge of infringement. 
Since something less than a formal takedown notice may now establish red flag 
knowledge and EMI offers communications acknowledging likely infringement, the issue of 
Defendants' red flag knowledge cannot be resolved on summary judgment. This Court reaches 
this conclusion reluctantly, given MP3tunes' salutary practice of sending instructions regarding 
DMCA-compliant takedown notices to third parties reporting possible infringement and the 
DMCA's disavowal of any duty on the part of service providers to monitor user content. See 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 
("[I]f investigation of facts and circumstances is required to identify material as infringing, then 
those facts and circumstances are not red flags.") (internal citations omitted); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
CCBill LLC, 488 F .3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) ("We do not place the burden of determining 
whether [materials] are actually illegal on a service provider."). Accordingly, this Court 
withdraws its prior grant of summary judgment to Defendants on their lack of red flag 
knowledge and instead concludes that there are material issues of fact that warrant trial. 
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C. mducement of Copyright mfringement as a Distinct Cause of Action 
Finally, EMI contends the Viacom ruling confirmed that inducement of copyright 
infringement is a cause of action separate and distinct from contributory copyright infringement. 
EMI relies on a footnote in which the Second Circuit cited Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios mc. 
v. Grokster for the proposition that "[ dJoctrines of secondary copyright infringement include 
contributory, vicarious, and inducement liability." Viacom, 676 F.3d at 29 n.5 (citing 545 U.S. 
913,930 (2005)). On October 16, 2009, this Court dismissed EMI's stand-alone inducement 
claim as duplicative of its contributory copyright infringement claim, also relying on Grokster. 
Capitol Records, mc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2009 WL 3364036, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16,2009). EMI attributes this Court's reading of Grokster to legal uncertainty in 
2009 about whether inducement liability could be a stand-alone cause of action. See, e.g., Arista 
Records LLC v. Usenet.com, mc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 150 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("it is worth 
noting that several courts recently have expressed doubt as to whether inducement of 
infringement states a separate claim for relief, or rather whether it is a species of contributory 
infringement."). 
m view of subsequent decisions including Viacom, EMI asks this Court to revive 
its dismissed inducement claim as a separate cause of action. Defendants contend that the 
Viacom footnote does not announce an intervening change in law as to whether inducement 
liability is a stand-alone cause of action. But Viacom's reading of Grokster nevertheless 
warrants reconsideration of the dismissal ofEMI's claim. See Virgin Atl. Airways, 956 F.2d at 
1255 (a court may reconsider its own decisions prior to final judgment). 
According to EMI, an inducement of copyright infringement claim requires a 
showing of bad faith: that the defendant engaged in purposeful conduct that encouraged 
copyright infringement. Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 425 
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(S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937 ("The inducement rule, instead, premises 
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct[.]"). Contributory infringement, on the 
other hand, requires only that the defendant, ''with knowledge of the infringing activity, ... 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another." Lime Group, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 
432. Critically, EMI argues that the DMCA safe harbor cannot shelter a defendant from an 
inducement claim, because "the intentional nature of inducement is incompatible with the basic 
premise ofDMCA immunity." (PIs.' Br. in SUpp. ofMot. for Recons., dated Nov. 12,2012 at 
19.) 
This Court is aware of no authority for the proposition that the DMCA safe harbor 
is ~ se unavailable in an inducement claim, or that evidence of inducement would obviate the 
requirement to prove actual or red flag knowledge of infringement. While Judge Baer noted in 
Usenet that "if Defendants were aware of ... red flags [pointing to user infringement], or worse 
yet, if they encouraged or fostered such infringement, they would be ineligible for the DMCA's 
safe harbor provisions," he revoked the safe harbor protection as a discovery sanction and not 
because he concluded that plaintiffs established inducement liability. Usenet.com, 633 F. SUpp. 
2d at 142. Rather than introducing a categorical bar to the safe harbor, the case law indicates 
only that inducement conduct may be relevant to establish an exception to safe harbor protection, 
such as actual or apparent knowledge of infringement. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. 
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1043 (9th Cir. 2013) (''while [the defendant's] inducing actions do not 
necessarily render him ~ se ineligible for protection under § 512{c), they are relevant to our 
determination that [the defendant] had 'red flag' knowledge ofinfringement"). 
This is not a remarkable observation given that the DMCA safe harbor exceptions 
are aimed at bad faith infringers. MP3tunes, 821 F. SUpp. 2d at 637 {"The purpose of subsection 
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512(i) is to deny protection to websites that tolerate users who flagrantly disrespect 
copyrights."). Indeed, EMI advanced evidence of inducement at summary judgment for that 
purpose. Such evidence included MP3tunes touting Sideload.com as a source for "free music on 
the internet" and encouraging users to add MP3 files from the internet to sideload.com. (Bart 
Decl. Ex. 86.) But this Court rejected that evidence in finding that MP3tunes "did not promote 
infringement" or tolerate blatant infringers. MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 645. Regardless of 
whether an inducement claim can be a separate cause of action, this Court finds that such a claim 
would be futile. While EMI argues that it has "significant further evidence" demonstrating 
defendants' intent to encourage infringement, that proposition is not buttressed by testimony or 
documents. The evidence before the Court is not sufficient to meet the "high degree ofproof' 
required for an inducement claim. See Fung, 710 F.3d at 1034. And given the zealous advocacy 
throughout this litigation, this Court doubts that EMI held back evidence on its motion for 
summary judgment. Accordingly, this Court denies EMI's request to revive its inducement 
claim as futile. 
D. Infringement ofEMI's Cover Art 
Robertson also cites Viacom as a basis for reconsideration of this Court's ruling 
regarding the alleged infringement ofEMI's copyrighted album cover art. In October 2006, 
pursuant to a licensing agreement with Amazon.com, MP3tunes' Lockersync program began 
allowing users to retrieve and display the corresponding album cover art from Amazon.com 
while playing a song in their MP3tunes lockers. MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 635. Ifcover art 
was not part of a music file or stored on a user's computer, LockerSync retrieved the cover art 
from Amazon.com and displayed a link to that website. MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 635. 
Under the licensing agreement, MP3tunes was permitted to display the cover art for the 
"principal purpose" of driving traffic to Amazon.com's website. MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 
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635. EMI maintains that MP3tunes directly infringed its copyrights in the cover art, in breach of 
the licensing agreement with Amazon.com. In the October 2011 Order, this Court found 
questions of fact precluded a ruling because of "contradictory proof' on the issues of MP3tunes' 
use and storage ofcover art, and the direction of traffic to Amazon.com. MP3tunes, 821 F. 
Supp. 2d at 650. 
Robertson now contends that Viacom precludes copyright infringement liability 
for the cover art because it is protected by the DMCA safe harbor, and it is undisputed that the 
cover art was never the subject of any takedown notices. The § 512(c) safe harbor "is only 
available when the infringement occurs 'by reason of the storage at the direction ofa user of 
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service 
provider.'" Viacom, 676 F.3d at 39 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(I)). In Viacom, the Second 
Circuit concluded that the § 512(c) safe harbor "is clearly meant to cover more than mere 
electronic storage lockers." Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38. Rather, its protections "extend[] to 
software functions performed 'for the purpose of facilitating access to user-stored materiaL'" 
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 39 (citing UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 
1081, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2008)). The Second Circuit went on to find that YouTube's "related 
videos" function, "by which a Y ouTube computer algorithm identifies and displays 'thumbnails' 
ofclips that are 'related' to the video selected by the user" was such a function: "Because the 
algorithm 'is closely related to, and follows from, the storage itself,' and is 'narrowly directed 
toward providing access to material stored at the direction of users,' .... the related videos 
function is also protected by the § 512(c) safe harbor." Viacom, 676 F.3d at 39-40 (quoting 
UMG Recordings, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1092)). 
10 

Case 1:07-cv-09931-WHP-FM   Document 368    Filed 05/14/13   Page 10 of 19
MP3tunes' cover art function uses an algorithm that retrieves, copies, stores, and 
displays cover art from Amazon.com related to those songs a user chooses to sideload. (Defs.' 
Br. in SUpp. of Mot. for Recons. ("D. Br."), dated Nov. 12,2012 at 27.) Robertson likens 
MP3tunes' cover art algorithm to YouTube's 'related videos' algorithm, noting that both were 
fully automated and required no input from service provider employees. But while MP3tunes' 
cover art algorithm retrieved and copied cover art solely in response to a user's song selection, 
the cover art itself was provided by Amazon.com, not other MP3tunes users. As such, the cover 
art is not stored at the direction ofa user, but rather presented to users by MP3tunes as part of an 
automated marketing ploy. Further, Robertson admits that "MP3tunes used the cover art for the 
principal purpose of driving traffic to Amazon.com's website." (D. Br. at 29.) As such, the 
primary purpose of the cover art algorithm is not narrowly tailored to "facilitat[ e] access to user 
stored material" but rather to prompt users to go to a separate website entirely for the purpose of 
purchasing music. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 39. 
According to Robertson, Viacom affords safe harbor protection to any software 
functions or "architectural decisions" which "enhance user experiences" through a fully 
automated system operating solely in response to user input. (D. Br. at 27.) But "facilitating 
access to user stored material" and "enhancing user experiences" are not coextensive. Viacom 
approves the former, but does not address the latter. Under Robertson's interpretation, § 5l2(c) 
would protect any fully automated software function that "enhances" a user's experience by, for 
example, responding to a user's sideload ofone song by automatically sideloading additional 
songs by the same artist. Such an interpretation of Viacom would stretch the definition of 
"storage by direction of a user" beyond the pale. Therefore, this Court declines to rule that 
MP3tunes' cover art algorithm is shielded by the § 512(c) safe harbor. As such, Robertson's 
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motion for reconsideration of this issue is denied and EMI's cover art infringement claim must 
proceed to trial. 1 
II. Robertson's Liability for Direct Copyright Infringement of 47 Songs 
In the October 2011 Order, this Court found Robertson liable for direct copyright 
infringement of forty-seven songs he personally sideloaded from unauthorized websites in order 
to "seed" Sideload.com with quality songs. MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 649. The issue was 
decided sua sponte. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(f); Garanti Finansal Kiralama A.S. v. Aqua Marine 
and Trading Inc., 697 F.3d 59,64 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[D]istrict courts are widely acknowledged to 
possess the power to enter summary judgment sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on 
notice that it had to come forward with all of its evidence."). This Court now reconsiders this 
ruling with the benefit of briefing from Robertson. 
To establish direct copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove ownership of a 
valid copyright and unauthorized copying by a third party. See Island Software & Computer 
Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257,260 (2d Cir. 2005). Robertson offers various 
factual arguments attacking the validity ofEMI's copyrights in the songs and suggesting that 
many of them were sideloaded from authorized websites. Most of these arguments are identical 
to those previously advanced by MP3tunes, which this Court rejected in finding that EM! stated 
a prima facie case of copyright ownership in numerous songs, including the forty-seven now at 
issue. See MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 647. This Court also found that those songs were 
copied unlawfully from unauthorized third party websites. MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 647. 
Robertson's recycled arguments-including his "works for hire" argument-do not warrant a 
To the extent EMI failed to list the artist of any cover art registered on a form SR, 
copyright ownership is a disputed issue that must proceed to trial. See U.S. Copyright Office, 
Copyright Registration for Sound Recordings, Copyright Circular # 56, at 3 (2004). 
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different result for the bulk of the sideloaded songs.2 However, this Court finds that Robertson 
has created an issue of fact as to EMI's ownership of the copyrights for two ofthe songs he 
sideloaded, "White Christmas" by Frank Sinatra and "Devil in Me" by 22-20s, because Plaintiffs 
did not provide registrations for those copyrights. Further, EMI relies on copyrights registered as 
compilations for thirteen of the songs Robertson sideloaded. Because compilations contain pre­
existing constituent works that may have been fixed prior to February 15, 1972 or that may have 
been previously registered by another owner, Robertson has created an issue of fact with respect 
to those songs. See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Registration for Sound Recordings, 
Copyright Circular # 56, at 4 (2004) ("The copyright in the compilation of recordings is separate 
and distinct from copyright (if any) in the recordings themselves."). 
While Robertson proffers some new evidence, it falls short ofwhat this Court 
indicated would be required to rebut a finding ofdirect infringement of the remaining songs-
either evidence that the websites involved in free viral marketing campaigns were identical to the 
URLs from which Robertson sideloaded, or evidence sufficient to show a broad implied license 
to use the songs. See MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 647-48. For instance, Robertson points to a 
letter from Hopeless Records stating that it was "authorized" to offer free MP3s of the song 
"Eternal Rest" by Avenged Sevenfold. (Declaration ofMichael Robertson ("Robertson Decl."), 
dated Nov. 11,2012 Ex. 7.) Similarly, Robertson's counsel offers a conversation he had with an 
Amazon.com legal assistant, who indicated that Amazon.com was "authorized" to make the song 
"A Groovy Kind of Love" by the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra available for download, though 
she could not confirm it was for free. (Declaration ofMark Lafayette, dated Nov. 12,2012 at'l 
Robertson's arguments regarding the availability of statutory damages or attorney's fees 
for three songs by the music group Air and his argument that some of the sideloaded songs 
violate the same copyright relate to the issue of damages, and this Court does not resolve them 
now. 
13 
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11.) But this evidence fails to show that Plaintiffs themselves authorized any free downloads, or 
when such downloads were even offered. Similarly, a screenshot indicating that Spin.com 
offered a free MP3 file of another song at issue by the band Panic at the Disco is unauthenticated 
and does not show that EMI authorized the promotion. (Robertson Decl. Ex. 4.) Such evidence 
does not constitute the "narrow circumstances" under which courts find implied licenses. Ulloa 
v. Universal Music and Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409,416 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Nor 
does it suffice to show abandonment of Plaintiffs' copyrights. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. 
Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471,483-84 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Because this Court finds that Robertson fails to establish a broad implied license 
for the songs at issue, the equitable defenses he raises against EMI are without merit. Further, 
this Court rejects Robertson's request to reopen discovery or revisit earlier discovery disputes. 
Reliefunder Rule 56(d) "is not available when summary judgment motions are made after the 
close ofdiscovery." Espada v. Schneider, 522 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Discovery 
in this action was supervised by Magistrate Judge Maas and closed in January 2010. This Court 
declines to entertain another encore. 
III. Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant Robertson 
In July 2012, this Court ruled it had personal jurisdiction over Robertson. On his 
reconsideration motion, Robertson advances substantially the same arguments this Court 
previously rejected, including his argument that "sideloading" is distinct from "uploading" in 
determining the situs of copyright injury under Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. American Buddha, 
16 N.Y.3d 295,302 (2011)-an argument this Court still finds to be without merit. (See 
Transcript, dated July 20,2012 ("July 2012 Tr.") at 5:5-7.) A motion for reconsideration is not 
an opportunity to "treat the court's initial decision as the opening of a dialogue ... in response to 
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the court's rulings." De Los Santos v. Fingerson, No. 97 Civ. 3972 (MBM), 1998 WL 788781, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1998). Therefore, this Court addresses only one ofRobertson's 
arguments. 
Robertson, a California resident, contends this Court erred in finding that he 
committed tortious conduct that could reasonably be expected to cause injury in New York under 
its long arm statute, CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii). In making that finding, this Court relied on its sua 
sponte ruling in the October 2011 Order that Robertson was directly liable for copyright 
infringement of songs he personally sideloaded to MP3tunes' server. (July 2012 Tr. at 4:3-10.) 
Robertson argues that this is improper. But this Court has now reaffirmed Robertson's liability 
for most of the forty-seven songs after affording him an opportunity to brief the issue. Further, a 
showing of conclusive liability for tortious conduct is not required for personal jurisdiction. 
Rather, "where the parties have conducted extensive discovery regarding the defendant's 
contacts with the forum state, but no evidentiary hearing has been held, the plaintiffs prima facie 
showing, necessary to defeat a jurisdiction testing motion, must include an averment of facts 
that, if credited by [the ultimate trier of fact], would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the 
defendant." Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560,567 (2d Cir. 1996). The 
record EMI submitted on summary judgment satisfies this burden. Therefore, this Court adheres 
to its finding ofpersonal jurisdiction over Robertson. 
IV. Robertson's Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability 
Whether Robertson was vicariously liable for the contributory infringement of 
those songs that MP3tunes failed to remove upon receipt ofDMCA-compliant takedown notices 
was not before this Court in October 2011. This Court now considers Robertson's motion for 
summary judgment on the issue ofhis vicarious liability. To prevail on a motion for summary 
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judgment, the moving party must demonstrate each essential element of its infringement claim or 
defense. Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003). "The court shall 
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter o flaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 97 (2d 
Cir. 2007). The burden ofdemonstrating the absence ofany genuine dispute as to a material fact 
rests with the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The Court 
resolves all factual ambiguities and draws all inferences in favor ofthe non-moving party. 
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; Jeffreys v. City ofN.Y., 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005). 
To be vicariously liable for MP3tunes' contributory infringement, Robertson must 
have (1) had the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct and (2) received a fmancial 
benefit directly attributable to the infringing conduct. Usenet.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 156; see 
also Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (a defendant is liable for vicarious copyright infringement by 
"profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it"); 
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36 ("The common law imposes liability for vicarious copyright 
infringement when the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial 
interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials[.]") (internal alterations and quotations 
omitted). 
Robertson argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on the issue ofhis 
vicarious liability because this Court found, in evaluating whether MP3tunes was eligible for the 
DMCA safe harbor, that MP3tunes "neither received a direct financial benefit nor controlled the 
infringing activity." MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 646. Thus, Robertson contends that EMI is 
collaterally estopped from proving the fmancial benefit prong of the vicarious liability test. 
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Robertson also argues that the "law of the case" doctrine prohibits a finding ofvicarious liability. 
Under this doctrine, a "decision on an issue oflaw made at one stage of a case becomes binding 
precedent to be followed in subsequent stages of the same litigation." In re PCH Assocs., 949 
F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991). 
The DMCA safe harbor is lost where a direct financial benefit from the users' 
infringing activity is found. But vicarious liability arises from common law, not from the 
DMCA. See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 37-38 (finding that the DMCA is not a codification of 
common law vicarious liability principles for copyright infringement). Under the common law 
vicarious liability standard, there must be "a causal relationship between the infringing activity 
and any financial benefit a defendant reaps, regardless ofhow substantial the benefit is in 
proportion to a defendant's overall profits." Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 
2004); see also Usenet.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 157 ("the law is clear that to constitute a direct 
financial benefit, the 'draw' of infringement need not be the primary, or even a significant, 
draw-rather, it need only be 'a' draw."). Further, the financial benefit prong for vicarious 
liability has been found even where no financial benefit was realized. See, e.g., A & M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("direct financial benefit does 
not require earned revenue, so long as the defendant has economic incentives for tolerating 
unlawful behavior"), rev'd on other grounds, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Because it is clear 
that the "direct financial benefit" prong of the common law vicarious liability standard is 
construed more broadly than it is under the DMCA, Robertson's collateral estoppel and "law of 
the case" arguments are without merit. 
While Robertson argues that he did not personally benefit from MP3tunes' 
infringement because he is not a shareholder ofMP3tunes and has not held any membership 
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interest since 2006, it is undisputed that he held a beneficial interest in the SKL trust, which held 
a substantial interest in MP3tunes. Cf. Lime GrouQ, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 439 (holding that an 
individual holding an indirect ownership interest could be liable for that company's 
infringement). As such, there is a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whether Robertson 
benefited from the infringement in satisfaction of the common law vicarious liability standard. 
Further, "[a]ll persons and corporations who participate in, exercise control over, or benefit from 
the infringement" may be held jointly and severally liable as copyright infringers. Usenet.com, 
633 F. Supp. 2d at 158. Whether Robertson was "personally and intimately involved in many of 
the activities that form the basis of [MP3tunes'] copyright liability" is an open question. 
Usenet.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 158. Accordingly, Robertson's motion for summary judgment is 
denied. 
Finally, because there are issues of fact regarding whether Robertson can be held 
liable for the infringement ofMP3tunes, or whether Robertson received any commercial benefit 
from the infringement, EMI's unfair competition claim against Robertson will also proceed to 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, EMI's motion for reconsideration in light ofVia com v. 
YouTube is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, EMI's motion is granted as to the 
issue ofwillful blindness and "red flag" knowledge, and denied as to the inducement of 
copyright claim. Defendant Robertson's motion for reconsideration of the October 2011 Order 
regarding direct copyright infringement is granted in part and denied in part. Robertson's 
motions for (1) reconsideration ofthe October 2011 Order regarding infringement ofEMI's 
cover art, (2) reconsideration ofthe July 2012 Order regarding personal jurisdiction, and (3) 
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summary judgment as to his vicarious liability are denied. The Clerk of Court is directed to 
tenninate the motions pending at ECF No.'s 333, 334, and 341. 
Dated: May 14, 2013 
New York, New York 
SO ORDERED: 
~---~ \> ~'"~~ ­
WILLIAM H. PAULEYUr=-r " 
U.S.D.J. 
All Counsel ofRecord 
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